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THE JAG CORPS AND RULE OF LAW REFORM: AN INTERVIEW WITH BRIGADIER 
GENERAL THOMAS AYRES 
THOMAS AYRES1
Q: You were commissioned in the U.S. Army after graduating from West Point in 1984, and later 
received a JD from Penn Law and an LLM from the Judge Advocate General’s School. You’ve 
served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For those who may not be familiar with the JAG Corps, can 
you give some background on the Corps and your role? 
We like to think of the JAG Corps as the oldest, largest law firm in the country. We number over 
9,400 people, including about 4,400 attorneys, half of whom are active duty. We have Judge 
Advocates embedded at every level of command in the Army. 
The head of our “law firm” is the Judge Advocate General who works at the Pentagon and is the 
principal legal advisor to the senior Army leadership. I work under him meeting a lot of the needs 
for legal advice that the Army staff has. I also interact with our Judge Advocates throughout the 
world. 
Q: What has traditionally been the JAG Corps’ role? 
We’ve always said that we’ve done six core things: criminal law; legal assistance for Soldiers; 
claims work; administrative law; contract and fiscal law; and international and operational law, 
which includes being experts on the Geneva and Hague conventions. 
We’ve done these six operations for years and years and years. And until 9/11 that’s really all we 
did. 
Q: What changed for the JAG Corps after 9/11? 
For years, the Army’s mission was to fight and win the nation’s wars. We thought in terms of 
short duration wars, and we had two basic doctrinal templates: offense and defense. But because 
of what’s happened over the last seven or eight years, we’ve gone back to something that was true 
during Vietnam – that there are times of extended conflict when you have to engage in stability 
operations. That takes a level of planning and involvement that you just wouldn’t have in 
                                                          
1 This interview was originally conducted, condensed, and published by Steven Barnes, Associate Director 
of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. It was made available on the University of 
Pennsylvania’s website on September 21, 2010.  The interview is republished here for this Special Issue. The interviewee, 
Brigadier General Ayres, spoke at the conference, The Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan: Challenges for the 
Coming Decade, which was co-sponsored by Penn Law and the National Constitution Center on September 23 and 24, 
2010.  Here, he answers questions about his career as a Judge Advocate General and how the Corps has changed since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. 
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traditional wartime. 
Doctrinally, if we say we are going to do stability operations, we have to do not only do things 
like build schools and pick up trash but also rule of law. We still do each of the six core functions, 
but we also have this new function now. 
Q: How did the realization that the JAG Corps needed to add a new “rule of law” function come 
about? 
As we got into Iraq and Afghanistan, we realized that we needed to assist the governments to 
stand back up. That had always been something that Civil Affairs did, but both countries are so 
big that Civil Affairs couldn’t do it on their own this time; there weren’t enough people to get the 
courts stood up, prosecutors and defense attorneys in place, correctional facilities functioning, 
and so on. 
Commanders heard “rule of law” and turned to in-house counsel embedded with them, and so 
Judge Advocates started to become involved in rule of law operations. For instance, when I was 
in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, I would go down to the Ramadi courthouse to meet with the judges one 
to three times a week. We weren’t trying to tell them what their laws should be, but to figure out 
what they needed to get their courts working again. 
Q: What did the governments need in terms of rule of law support? 
The thing that an immature government is not good at is seeing what’s happening out in the 
provinces. So our major task was to help them see themselves. We would help get reports to the 
central people in Iraq; we could help them see if they need a courthouse, if they need judges. 
They were used to a system under Saddam Hussein – he would keep power by closely managing 
judges. He’d send them to different places around the country, but he’d never send them home. A 
lot of them wanted to get back to where they were from. At the same time, we were working with 
the transitional government to try to figure out if the judges had been involved in past abuses and 
whether they should be allowed to continue. I was there more recently and we’ve made great 
strides here. 
Q: You said that the JAG Corps didn’t try to impose particular laws on the Iraq and Afghan 
governments. But are there universal norms that a country might need to adopt as part of their rule 
of law reform? 
It’s a fine line. We do have a culturally centric, ethnocentric view of things sometimes. For 
example, under Saddam the police were corrupt. They didn’t enforce the law; the secret police 
and the Iraqi military did. So we were trying to stand up a police force that didn’t have a history 
of law enforcement under the old regime, and to create a clear line between police and army. But 
the idea that military doesn’t do law enforcement isn’t true everywhere, even in some western 
countries. But it is one that people are now embracing in Iraq. 
Another example is that under Sharia law, the best evidence is the statement of two witnesses. 
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We’re not going to fight that, but at the same time we have forensics labs and technicians. So we 
teach the judges and the police, and train forensics experts. It’s a tremendous effort and it’s really
starting to bear fruit. Early on we’d bring an American forensics person in, and a lot of judges 
would say, that’s American mumbo jumbo. But if you train an Iraqi forensics expert, the judge is 
more likely to accept it. 
There are also some bright lines. For example, the standard under Saddam for 40 years was that 
you physically beat someone until they confess. But that can’t be the standard anymore. So we are 
trying to help them see themselves against a universal, international standard. 
Q: Can you give an example of how the JAG Corps is adapting to meet the new rule of law 
function? 
What you find in Iraqi society, and many societies throughout the world, is that judges respect 
gray hair. But our attorneys tend to be young. In a fairly large area, you’ll have a major – maybe 
30 to 32 years old – and a couple of captains who are right out of law school. They aren’t only 
doing the six core functions, but also running down to the courthouse, and so on. And it’s hard for 
the judges to listen to them because they’re so young. 
One of the ways we’re dealing with this is to use our reservists. We have reservists who are 
lifetime prosecutors and judges in small towns throughout the country, and when we’ve used them 
for this sort of function in the past we’ve been very successful. We’re looking at ways to make this 
more of a doctrinal approach. 
Q: What are some of the major obstacles you see in supporting rule of law reform in Iraq and 
Afghanistan? 
One of our biggest obstacles is the limited number of people we have to do this work. When I was 
in Ramadi, Iraq – a town of roughly 500,000 people – we’d usually have three or four attorneys 
interacting with a courthouse, with judges, lawyers, cops, correctional facilities. You really can’t 
do everything. 
In the early days, we were trying to do it all as a military. In Ramadi, we had one State 
Department representative for 18,000 troops. That changed; we learned we need things called 
provisional reconstruction teams – teams of seven or eight people headed by the State 
Department, including one rule of law person from the Department of Justice. The PRTs started 
coming online in about 2007-2008. They were really helpful, but they also brought this new 
challenge of people being out of sync. You’d have people working on laudable goals – like fixing 
the commercial law, or having more women lawyers and judges – but in the military, we were 
focusing on basic stability. Something that helped was that General Petraeus and the Ambassador 
(the chief of mission) were completely in sync, and that was really important to see. That’s the 
kind of thing they’re trying to do in Afghanistan now. 
Q: Among other awards, you’ve received the Canadian Parachutist Badge and the Master 
Parachutist Badge. What is a Judge Advocate General doing parachuting? 
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I was part of the 82ndAirborne Division, and all members need to parachute. The way you get 
into battle is to jump. The problem with jumping is, the parachutes are not designed to be in the 
air very long. It’s not a soft landing. 
My mother would often say about my jumping, “Tell me again why you need to do that.” Then 
when I went to Afghanistan, she’d say, “Tell me again why we need lawyers in Afghanistan.” 
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